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Build like a camel: open options, an early exit within reach, and less dilution

Petri Lehmuskoski ·

Most founders are taught there is only one way to build a startup

Most founders I meet have been taught one way to build a company. Raise early, raise big, hire ahead of revenue, grow fast, raise again. That is the unicorn path, and it is usually presented as how startups work. Many founders never hear that it is one choice among several.

Investors carry the same belief. Last week I met a group of Italian angels. Their argument was the power law: a handful of outliers return everything, so the only way to make money is to back companies swinging for a billion. We talked it through, and nobody at the table moved. For them, there was no other way to make money.

The power law is real for the investor who is in every round. That investor keeps buying ownership as the company raises its second, fifth and tenth round. When you have not invested in all rounds, the power law crumbles.

Take a company on the unicorn path that raises ten rounds, and let each round after the angel's sell 20% of the company. The angel who wrote the first ticket and never followed on ends up holding 13.4% of the original stake.

For an angel portfolio to make 20% a year, its one winner has to carry the whole portfolio. With 13.4% of the stake left, the company's value must grow about 400 times from the angel's entry valuation. That is dilution alone, before a single liquidation preference has taken its share.

Even investors who do follow on rarely capture it. AngelList studied its own returns data and concluded that power-law returns mean only top-quartile VCs beat the market.

The founder sits in a worse seat still. An investor holds a portfolio and needs one outlier in it. The founder holds one company. A strategy that only works on average across a hundred bets is a strange thing to build your one company around.

Gorilla has never needed the power law. Our returns have come from many positive exits, with fewer failures than a typical VC portfolio and proportionally more positive exits. That is the camel path, seen from the investor's chair.

Alex Lazarow named the camel startup in Harvard Business Review in 2020 and in his book Out-Innovate. His camel is built to survive long stretches of harsh conditions. We use the same animal for a narrower point: the camel path is a choice of route. It says nothing about how big the destination can be.

The camel path keeps open the options a big raise closes

A large round is a commitment about the future. By signing it, a founder agrees to grow very fast, raise several more rounds, aim for a very large exit, and accept dilution, loss of control and pressure to scale before the machine works. That is a fair deal if the company fits the model. Most companies do not.

The cost shows up as options that quietly disappear:

  • The smaller exit. An offer that would change the founder's life becomes unacceptable, because the cap table now needs a much bigger number.
  • Changing direction. The investors bought a story about one market, so moving to another is hard.
  • Choosing profitability over growth. It stops being the founder's decision.

None of this is announced. Each round is reasonable on the day it is signed.

The camel path runs in a different order. It scales only after demand is proven. It raises the amount the next milestone needs, not the amount on offer. It measures progress in cash flow and unit economics. The options stay on the table:

  • grow fast if the evidence supports it, or slowly if the market demands it
  • sell early or late
  • stay independent
  • raise later from a position of strength, or never raise at all

Before any round, we ask founders two questions. What must the next 12 months prove? And what exit size will this round require afterwards? If the second answer is bigger than anything a buyer in your market pays, the round has closed your exit options before you spend a euro of it.

An early exit stays a good outcome when the cap table is light

The startup exit market is mostly a trade-sale market. Across 20+ positive exits, the buyer has usually been a company that wanted the customers, the product or the team for its own roadmap. It was rarely the public market.

The same price can mean two very different things. A €15M acquisition can be a great outcome for a lightly funded company with a clean cap table. For a company that raised too much at too high a valuation, with liquidation preferences stacked on top, the same price can leave the founders with very little. The buyer pays the same either way. The funding history decides who gets paid.

Small deals also close more easily. A business unit leader who sees a product gap can often drive a smaller acquisition with a handful of people. A large deal needs committees, more legal work and more internal risk-taking, and it can die because a budget cycle closed.

This is why we treat the first meaningful exit range as a gate, not a ceiling. A founder who reaches it with a light cap table gets to choose: sell, continue on customer money, or raise to go bigger.

Less dilution means the founder keeps more of what the work built

The unicorn path dilutes the founder at every round. In my experience, a company on that path typically goes through around ten rounds and is held for 10 to 15 years. Every round takes a slice, and every preference sits ahead of the founder in the payout.

A simple illustration: a €20M exit with 70 to 80% founder ownership pays the founder more than a €200M exit with 5%. It is also far more likely to happen, because there are many more buyers at €20M than at €200M.

Dilution shows up first as money. It also costs control. The founder with a majority stake decides when to sell, when to change direction and when to choose profit. The founder with a small stake gets a vote.

One angel round, then customers paid for the growth

One company in our portfolio raised a single angel round. We were in it. After that, customers paid for the growth.

When the company was sold to a buyout fund, the founders still owned most of it. The angel investors received a 70x return.

On the unicorn path, nine later rounds dilute the angel, and the company's value has to grow about 400 times before the angel's return carries a portfolio. This company raised no later rounds. Our stake was not diluted at all on the way to the exit, so every bit of value the company built came through to us.

That is a camel on a cap table: one early round, founders in control at the exit, customers paying for every step after.

Some markets punish the slow route, and founders should know which ones

The camel path does not fit every company. It breaks when a business needs a lot of capital before any customer can pay, as much deep tech does. It breaks when entry valuations are already too high for any realistic exit to pay back. And it breaks when a company sets out to conquer the world too early, with too little.

The usual objection is the winner-take-all market, where a funded competitor takes everything while the camel is still walking. In my experience the winner rarely takes it all. There are always competitors next to the market leader that have built great businesses.

When a founder asks whether venture capital is the right tool, the questions I put to them are blunt:

  1. Do you have evidence of strong, scalable demand?
  2. Does your business model require massive upfront investment?
  3. Is your market large enough to justify venture economics?
  4. Do you really want a billion-euro outcome, and are you ready to give up control and carry the pressure that comes with it?

If the answer to all four is yes, venture capital may be the right tool.

I have also passed on companies that later became extremely successful. The camel path is a better probability, not a guarantee, and some unicorns are built exactly the way the Italian angels described.

For most founders, though, the unicorn path is chosen by default, before anyone has asked those four questions. Founders on that path rarely notice the moment their options become only a few. It happens one signature at a time. A camel founder still has the smaller exit, the change of direction and the profitable year on the table when the hard decision arrives.

More scars than trophies.

The dilution and portfolio figures illustrate my own model (ten rounds of 20% dilution, a ten-year hold, no follow-on investment); they are not observed returns. The portfolio company is not named.