Across 280+ investment rounds, I have seen where the early angel sits when a VC-backed company exits: at the bottom of the waterfall, barely above the founders, and sometimes not above them at all.
That would matter less if founders did well. A paper from Wharton and the University of Zurich shows that most of them do not. Eduardo Azevedo, Florian Scheuer, Kent Smetters and Min Yang tracked 248,454 founders at 157,669 US VC-backed startups founded between 1987 and 2025. In the July 2026 version of their paper, 88% of those founders received nothing at exit. In 81% of cases the founders were wiped out as a group, because the company failed or because the investors took all the proceeds of a weak exit. Even among IPOs and acquisitions, 19% left the founders' combined stake at zero.
The paper says nothing directly about angels. It assumes the founders hold 80% before the first VC round and that angels, family and friends hold the rest. Its numbers describe the people standing next to you in the waterfall.
On the VC path, an early angel's outcome looks like the founder's
In an earlier article I worked through the dilution math. Ten rounds that each sell 20% leave the first angel 13.4% of the original stake, and a 20% portfolio then needs its winner to grow about 400 times from the angel's entry valuation. That was dilution alone.
This paper shows what that math could not: how the people next to the angel in the waterfall actually come out. An angel who wrote one early cheque and then watched later rounds stack preferences above it holds a ticket whose outcome looks much more like the founder's than the lead VC's. The VC who is in every round sits at the top of the stack, or next to it, and is paid first when the exit disappoints. The angel is paid after everyone above has been made whole.
A 2x preference can wipe out the angel and the founder on the same day
Take a company sold for €30M that has raised €20M. The founders hold 40%, the late-stage investors 30%, the early investors the rest. With a 1x non-participating preference on the latest round, the late-stage investors take their €20M and the remaining €10M is shared. The early investors collect €4.3M.
Change one number. At a 2x preference, the late-stage claim is €40M against a €30M sale. The late-stage investors take everything. The early investors collect nothing, on the same day the founders collect nothing.
Founders and early investors sit at the bottom of the stack together. It is usually the only moment in a company's life when their interests are identical, and usually the moment neither of them notices.
Investors on one cap table can need completely different exits
I have invested a couple of times in companies where the founder ended up between investors with diverging interests. One investor may own 20% of the company, another 2%. One may have two years left in its fund's life, another ten. One may run a power-law fund that needs a single enormous outcome to work at all, another may simply need a realised return. Each of them gives advice that is rational for its own position.
In one of those cases the company had a great product and real customers. It could have been sold while the founders were still majority owners. Instead the founders ended up in between and chose the unicorn path. Almost ten years later the company is worth five times more and the founders' stake has shrunk by 60%. It will probably still be an acceptable exit for the late investors. The founders' reward for those years will be minimal.
For the early investors, those years meant many dilutive rounds, each on better terms for the investors who came in later.
In a market without local buyers, the angel's exit moves further away
The paper's data comes from the US, the deepest exit market in the world. In less developed markets it is worse.
Where there are no local buyers for a large company, the VC path has to aim at a foreign exit, usually in the US. That exit has to be bigger, it takes more rounds to reach, and every round adds another layer to the stack above the early angel.
The same market physics set the size of the portfolio an angel needs. A strategy fails if the portfolio is too small, and smaller markets with less mature local exit markets need a larger one. In Finland I would put the floor at 40+ companies, and the same holds for most European markets outside the five largest.
Read the waterfall before the first cheque
An angel will object: "I take preferred shares too, or I invest pari passu with the VC, so I am not at the bottom." Those terms protect the angel only as far as the later rounds allow. The rounds, the terms and the years are set by other people after the angel has signed.
The only way an angel can fight the stack is to reinvest in every later round. Most angels cannot afford that on top of the large portfolio the strategy already requires. That is why only deep-pocketed angels fit the Silicon Valley playbook. Everyone else has to calculate at portfolio level and read the exit before the entry. The question at the first cheque is the founder's question too: what exit does this company need, and how many rounds stand between here and there?
Two things are cheap and almost never done. Run the waterfall at entry, and again after every round. And ask, before signing, whether later preferences will be stacked or pari passu. The question costs nothing before signature and cannot be asked after it.
The boundary is capital. In deep tech, medtech and anything with a long development cycle or a capital-heavy go-to-market, multiple rounds cannot be avoided. An angel backing those companies is signing up for the stack, and needs either the pockets to follow on or a price that already accounts for it.
The 88% is a statistic about founders. For the angel sitting one line above them, it is the base rate.
More scars than trophies.